Abstract: Until recently, many scholars continued to believe that the Sino-Soviet divergence began from the 20th Congress, which symbolized the emergence of a severe Sino-Soviet rift. Making use of newly available Chinese and Russian documentations, this article argues against the tendency of scholars to exaggerate the significance of the “Secret Speech” and de-Stalinization in the Sino-Soviet split. It contends that there was no fundamental divergence between the program of the 20th Congress and the views of the CCP and the 20th Congress had no negative effect on Sino-Soviet relations. In fact, subsequent development demonstrated that Sino-Soviet relations became closer without signs of serious divergences in the wake of the 20th Congress. Of course, the CCP and the CPSU were not entirely in agreement. To discuss the negative effect of the 20th Congress on Sino-Soviet relations, it is imperative to note that the open “self-criticism” of the CPSU and the unveiling of Stalin’s mistakes lowered the CPSU’s prestige and shook its leadership role in the socialist camp. In this process, the CCP gained influence and new pride. Mao Zedong seemed to be much more charismatic than Khrushchev. While the CPSU was in ideological chaos, communists around the world including some members of the CPSU expected that the CCP and Mao might be able to lead and guide the international Communist movement. Perhaps, these were the seeds of the eventual Sino-Soviet split.