This special issue explores the changing social phenomenon and institutional reform pertaining to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as analyzes the interactions between the two sides. Specific topics of interest include those with special focus on the political, economic, and social issues related to the region. The following five papers, written by Taiwanese scholars, seem to reflect a unique ‘Taiwanese perspective’.

The first article, “A Study on the Taiwan Experience and the China Model,” was written by Pang Chien-Kuo, professor at the Graduate Institute of Chinese Studies and Chinese Culture University. Pang is widely recognized for his expertise and groundbreaking research on the Taiwan experience. During the first decade of the 21st century, the embrace of the democratic consolidation embodied in the "Taiwan experience", along with the rise of the “China model”, have attracted worldwide attention. This article builds on macroeconomic and institutional theories at the country level to explore how the shared and distinctive characteristics pertaining to these phenomena contribute to our knowledge of the theory under discussion.

This article compares the political and economic developments in post-1949 Taiwan to post-1979 mainland China. With the increasing worldwide attention on the "China model" in recent years, the "Taiwan experience" pales in comparison. However, the authors argue that even in the midst of a diminished economic growth rate, Taiwan’s achievements in democratic consolidation in the 21st century are of considerable referential importance for subsequent political developments in mainland China.

Nonetheless, Pang recognizes the limitations of a comparison of Taiwanese economic development in the late 1940s to that of today’s mainland China. Due to the Taiwanese economy’s limited size, it is difficult to get beyond the export-oriented function. On the contrary, there is huge potential for mainland China to accomplish an economic transition from a "global factory" to an intriguing "global market". In other words, the emerging "China model" will be able to open up new domestic markets for mainland China, whereas the "Taiwan experience" must still follow on the export-oriented economy.

The "Taiwan experience" also informs us that in the long run, as an economy develops and a society matures, strengthened civil power and broadened public appeals inevitably follow suit. An authoritarian regime can be seen as a process still evolving towards a final stage. How to balance the different stages of development and to effectively master the rhythms of the democratic transition are the inevitable challenges for the academic and political elites of the mainland Chinese.

The Taiwanese democratization experience will enlighten mainland China in the following ways: first, as its economy develops and society matures, strengthened civil power and broadened public appeal is inevitable in mainland China; second, political democratization, like economic marketization, can trigger corresponding institutional developments through incremental changes (i.e. gradually improve the qualification of the election participants, and expand the range of the election pool); third, regardless of whether the political power continues or rotates, social stability is ensured in an efficient manner as long as an effective institutional system, accompanied by a democratic culture, is established; fourth, with the accomplishment of democracy, even restoring the lost political power becomes a matter of time.

Pang notes at the end of his paper that, under the current design of collective leadership, accompanied by limits in the retirement age and incumbent tenure, the CCP has partially solved the power transition problem through the means of institutionalization. With broad support among civilians, it is quite possible in the foreseeable future that the highly resilient authoritarian system will continue to rule. However, what is next? Will the "China model" proceed to achieve a political democracy thanks to the growing middle class and the rise of the modern civil society? Or will the insufficient institutional system and resistance from the Chinese leadership obstruct the transition process? We await the outcomes.

The second article (“A Study on the Identity of Hong Kong Residents: A Preliminary Investigation”) is written by Wang Chia-huang, professor of Sociology and Policy Sciences of Yuan Ze University, Taiwan. Wang outlines the particular characteristics and evolutionary process of the Hong Kong residential identification since 1997. Observations from telephone surveys and academic studies show that despite the effort of the Chinese central government and the Hong Kong SAR (Special Administration Regions) government to push on civil education to reestablish the national identity among Hong Kong residents, Hong Kong residents have not expressed the inclination to directly identify themselves with China; rather, they present characteristics of duality and complexity in their identifications. Wang builds his explanations and discussions of this phenomenon on two theories: “Imagined Community” by Benedict Anderson (1983), and “Identity Building” by Manuel Castells (1997).

The strategy and policy the CCP uses to reestablish the Hong Kong residents’ national identity indeed echoes Anderson (1983)’s framework of official nationalism. Through its strategy of cultural hegemonism, the CCP draws on curriculum formulation, textbook compilation, ceremonies (i.e. singing national anthem and raising the national flag) and activities (i.e. workshops, visits, student exchanges, and camps), as well as using the pro-China groups and media outlets to exert pressure and spread political propaganda on the Hong Kong SAR Government. In other words, the policies, strategies, and practices to reestablish the Hong Kong residents’ national identity by the CCP reflect those of the Western world in the earlier days.

Anderson (1983)’s “imagined community” theory can only explain the extent to which the Chinese central government, along with the Hong Kong SAR government, utilizes strategies, resources, and means to build what the communist government desires: national identity and official nationalism. However, the theory has limited scope to help explain the specific characteristics, connotations, formations, and developments of the Hong Kong residents’ national identity since colonization, especially during the past 30 years.

Castells argues that both identity and the sense of identity are processes of meaning construction based on cultural characteristics. There are three identity types: legitimizing identity, resistance identity, and projected identity. Legitimizing identity gives rise to a civil society, resistance identity brings about communes or communities, and project identity provokes the subject. How the identity is constructed, who the constructor is, and what construction methods are used depends on the social context.

Wang’s study points out that the issue of Hong Kong residents’ identity strongly reflects the dialectical interactions among the three types. On the face of it, the return of Hong Kong to China resumes China’s solidifying sovereignty over Hong Kong. Hong Kong residents’ national identity, on the other hand, has not directly integrated with the rest of China. Instead, the contemporary Hong Kong culture embodies aspects of the British historical and cultural heritage, the liberal political and economic infrastructures, and an identity of marketization along with pragmatism. These aspects, combined with China’s “one country, two systems” policy that aims to integrate the Chinese image into the regional life styles of Hong Kong, form Hong Kong’s post-colonial time hybrid cultural identity. This cultural identity is elastic, dynamic, and is not really an integrated part of the Chinese national identity. Whether or not the three different identities can follow the CCP’s directions to eventually converge into the integrated P. R. China core identity, and in turn accelerate Hong Kong’s democratization process through the legitimate identity construction process, depends on the emerging social contexts and the major national events taking place.

Clearly, the policies on civil education and national identity of the Chinese central government and the Hong Kong SAR government failed to convert the national identity of Hong Kong residents into the Chinese identity in a direct, quick and substantial manner. Wang believes that these policies emerge neither because the authority involved is inactive nor because the resources invested are inadequate, but rather due to the authoritarian system of China and the substantial lag of the CCP behind the democratic regimes. The key problem lies in the system and structure, rather than with the manner of execution of policies and strategies. It is this problem that the CCP should consider carefully.

The third article (“The causes of corruption in mainland China- Analysis of the endogenous and exogenous variables”) emphasizes the corruption issue since the beginning of the new century. It is co-authored by Chu Chao-Hsiang, politics professor of the National Taiwan Normal University and Tien Chao-Jung, doctoral student from the Chinese Culture University.

Corruption has been a major problem that needs to be addressed in the process of national governance and development of mainland China. The corruption problem has drawn the major attention of global scholars examining the issues related to the development of China. The authors argue that factors causing the corruption in mainland China are no doubt considerably complicated and diverse. However, they tend to fall into two categories – the endogenous factors and the exogenous factors. The endogenous factors include the existence of possibilities for rent-seeking, weakness of supervision and control mechanisms, relatively lower opportunity cost for acts of corruption, incentives for state seizure, lack of positive motivational incentives for officials, and interference by the negative motivational incentives for corruption. The exogenous factors include the administrative monopoly. If these factors are really the causes of corruption in mainland China, identifying approaches that respond to them would be a feasible solution to the problem of corruption.

The authors comprehensively analyze a series of endogenous variables related to the political corruption of mainland China, and propose that they are triggered by a decisive exogenous variable, "administrative monopoly", the essence of which lies in the administrative belief in the need to exert ultimate control, and the fear that the state would come to its demise without the presence of this tight hold on power. Such a false conception is inconsistent with the modern management science and results in many traps, triggering the rent-seeking behaviors of the officials, and finally leading to the current predominant situation of pervasive corruption. As administrative monopoly gives rise to political corruption, the important premise for anti-corruption becomes how to stop the emergence and spread of administrative monopoly through institutional design.

If China wants to completely eradicate corruption, it must enhance the democratic supervision mechanism to reduce the phenomenon of administrative monopoly.

On the one hand, the authors believe that democracy can provide a stable platform for interactive communications between the public and the elites. With an effective political system, citizens can effectively monitor the behaviors of political elites and curb the occurrence of political corruption. On the other hand, political corruption is a serious challenge to almost all types of political regime, with no exceptions, even in democratic countries. Notwithstanding, countries with long established democracies can reduce the opportunity for corruption by virtue of political and social supervision and judiciary sanction. On the contrary, apart from having oversight mechanisms in the system, authoritarian regimes lack external controls. Once within-system oversight mechanisms fail, corruption will be difficult to be detected and promptly stopped. In fact, the trend toward corruption in mainland China has emerged to a degree that is now difficult to curb. The CCP seems unable to come up with concrete solutions to this issue, except by trying to catch some significant cases and use them as bad examples (the so-called beating the dog before the lion). Therefore, proceeding with a 3-way interaction among social-political-cultural domains, and establishing effective democratic systems and procedures that incorporate the traditional Chinese political culture, are thought to be effective ways to avoid political corruption. The authors propose that democracy can provide a correction mechanism for the political system. Political corruption is essentially an obstacle during system operations, and it must be stopped. The correction mechanism in the democratic system is designed to counteract such systemic barriers. So, citizens and political elites, especially those of the lately emerged modernized countries, should not complain about corruption, but rather construct a democratic control mechanism to decrease the frequency and magnitude of its damage to the political system.

From a practical stand point, the author suggests that the CCP should at least test the feasibility of an anti-corruption program at the regional level to build up value added experience, because the process towards building a democratic and corruption-free government is an incremental one.

The fourth article ( “Solutions for Cross-Strait Political Reconciliation and Cooperative Mechanisms: From Realism to Constructivism”) is written by Chao Wen-chi, professor at the Institute of Strategy , Taiwan National Chung Cheng University.

The article points out that in the past cross-strait relations have been intense, conflicted, and confrontational, rather than smooth and harmonious. After President Ma Ying-jeou took office, however, there have been accelerated developments in this bilateral relationship. Especially after Ma acknowledged the 92 consensus, Taiwan and mainland China developed a closer, more cooperative relationship in terms of economic and trade activities. The signing of ECFA even more significantly pushed the cross-strait relationship into a brand new phase.

With the new developments in the cross-strait relationship, mainland China has begun to bring up the issues of cross-strait political negotiation and a peace agreement signing. The author thinks that sovereignty remains the biggest problem that hinders the progress of the cross-strait relationship from economic, cultural, and societal exchanges to military and political cooperation.

Building on the theory of international relations, Chao notes that the possibility of political reconciliation and even cooperation is not high if the cross-strait relationship is limited to a pragmatic perspective. However, under a constructivist perspective, if both sides adopt the view of “Kant’s culture” as a basic starting point, then there is the possibility for a cross-strait political relationship to evolve into a higher level of mutual cooperation and reconciliation.

Chao argues that the cross-strait relationship is extremely complex and tangled. In the past, regardless of changes of leaders, both sides have always adhered to their respective positions. Under the beliefs of realistic polarity, political reconciliation and cooperation mechanisms between the two sides are fraught with challenges and difficulties. This has largely prompted the zero-sum attitude between the two sides in the face of the high levels of political sensitivity, making it difficult for bilateral political reconciliation and cooperation.

China's position for political reconciliation and cooperation is premised on reunification, which deprives the Taiwanese independence from the government of the Republic of China, and consequently exacerbates the contradictions and conflicts between the two sides. This makes it difficult for sustained political reconciliation and cooperation.

Faced with this situation, Chao’s idea of constructivist perspective ("The Kant's culture") provides a new way of thinking between the two sides. Taiwan has begun to hope to establish goodwill through mutual interaction, and meanwhile has given up or left aside the sovereignty dispute. Even though mainland China hasn’t abandoned the declaration, there is still great possibility for mutual political reconciliation and cooperation, if both sides are willing to set aside the sovereignty dispute, to avoid preconditions during political dialogues, to establish goodwill and mutual trust through exchanges and interactions, and to let the cross-strait relationship follow its own path in the midst of exogenous changes.

The fifth article ( “The Comparison between Collective Bargaining agreements from the Taiwan Collective Bargaining Agreement Act and Collective Contract from the Mainland China Employment Contract Law”) is written by Hsieh Chey-Nan, Professor of Department of Labor Relations at the Chinese Culture University. This article provides comparisons related to the impact of labor laws on the economy and society in the recent years, particularly those collective bargaining agreements actively managed by both governments.

Even after Taiwan’s new collective agreement law is enacted and the mainland’s newly formulated Labor Contract Law and Collective Contract Regulation are revised, there will still be many problems that will need to be addressed for continuous improvements of the legal system to make it fit in with institutional needs.

Hsieh takes the position that many trade unions and enterprises in Taiwan and mainland China had not recognized the importance of collective bargaining agreements. Thus these collective agreements often do not comply with the principle of autonomy. Even if both sides have established collective negotiation mechanisms for enterprises and for trade unions, in practice equity or honesty is not fully embodied.

A collective negotiation system is the system for collective decision-making under the autonomous agreement of interested parties. Because enterprises aspire to reach a unilateral decision on working conditions to maximize management authority, the importance of the collaborative consultation makes it difficult for enterprises to come to an agreement.

In mainland China, individualized consultation often substitutes for collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, problems are addressed through negotiations among the chairman of the labor union and leaders of related administrative departments, rather than following formal collective bargaining procedures.

The centralized administrative power is the cause of possible problems in mainland China.

In Taiwan, the relationship between Taiwanese enterprises and workers is extremely unequal under the unfavorable environment of the globalized market economy. It is obvious that most small and medium sized Taiwanese enterprises are unable to adapt to the collective agreement system. Even though the new Taiwanese legislation has imposed mandatory consultation obligations on employers, the prospect of its future development is not hopeful.

Contracting parties establish private contractual relationships, which set the rights and obligations as well as the fine for breaching them. As such, both the contracting parties and involved parties highly anticipate autonomy in the implementation of their legal rights and interests.

Nevertheless, the mainland’s collective contract is an integral part of labor law, which is a social law in nature and belongs to the private contractual legal system. Since the relationship between the Labor Law and the General Principles of Civil Law is still unclear, whether the private contractual relationship belongs to the labor administrative law or the civil law remains to be further clarified.

Hsieh points out that due to the Mainland's historical experience and the overall political system, the collective consultation system is markedly affected by the nature of the planned economy. This leads the administrative departments to actively interfere to provide necessary support for vulnerable individual workers, without concerns for the rights and interests under the private contractual laws. This interruption makes theoretical sense, in terms of preventing excessive damages to the social benefit.

However, based on the legal principles, collective consultations and collective agreements are not legal protection systems that hinge on direct state interference to adjustments of working conditions. The collective agreement is an autonomous system originated and developed from collective labor law, and aimed to rectify malpractice which originated from the misapplication of the principle of freedom to individual labor contracts.

Based on the autonomy of collective contracts, the labor unions, along with the employers or employer groups, have the freedom to establish collective agreements, and can regulate working conditions for labor and capital through autonomous collective negotiations.

Therefore, if the state becomes excessively involved in the collective disputes arising from collective negotiations and agreements between employees and employers, it will damage the autonomous function of collective agreements. There is no benefit to the employees if both they and their employers rely excessively on the state while relinquishing of the independence and autonomy of their bilateral working relationships. Thus, to a certain extent countries should comply with the principles of national neutrality.

In Taiwan, consensus has reached between the theorists and the practitioners to abide by the concept of national neutrality. Nevertheless, in mainland China, employers and employees can only unconditionally accept the investigation results from the labor security department. If the labor security department dissents on the content of the collective contract, both employers and employees must renegotiate and revise the part under objection, and resubmit the revisions to the department for reexamination, until the authority is satisfied.

In other words, employers and employees have no means to apply any remedies to the administrative objections. When there is a dispute between the parties and the censors on whether a matter should be subjected to the ban agreement, the parties absolutely should not contest a lawsuit in the administrative departments. It is likely that the autonomous contracts established by collective agreements may be affected and altered due to the administrative investigations.