Government Monopoly, Dual-Track System and Excess Land Requisition:
A Theoretical and Empirical Study on the Reform from Land Requisition through Negotiation to Land Requisition through Public Notification
A Theoretical and Empirical Study on the Reform from Land Requisition through Negotiation to Land Requisition through Public Notification
Abstract: Arable land protection is an important task in terms of China’s overall security and stability, and its long-term future. However, excess land expropriation becomes accelerated, meanwhile the undefined role of the market vs the government on over-conversion of farmland causes lots of controversy. Using the fact that 1999 marked the year when land taking procedure was switched institutionally from land requisition through negotiation to land requisition through public notification, and the provincial data from 1995 to 2005, we conduct a theoretical and empirical study on how the government monopoly and dual-track system of land market, as well as excessive dependence of local government on land revenue worsen the land expropriation, resulting in over-conversion of farmland. Based on the findings we suggest that the government monopoly in land market should be abolished and collective-owned land should be treated equally as the state-owned land in the land market so that peasants can benefit more from the land appreciation.
Keywords: Government Monopoly, Dual-track System, Excessive Dependence of Local Government on Land Revenue, Excess Land Requisition
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